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THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:




"It has not been a well-kept secret. Anyone familiar with the
law of products liability knows that [the Restatement (Second)] is
out of date and requires revision."1
"We conclude that [the Restatement (Third)] has no basis in the
case law . . . Accordingly, we do not adopt . . . the Third
Restatement."2
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the American Law Institute ("ALI") adopted the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement
(Third)"). After over thirty years as the definitive, yet somewhat
confusing road map along the products liability highway, the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)") was turned
on its head. Before new case law involving the Restatement (Third)
has been given a chance to develop, commentators have risen ei-
ther to praise the Restatement (Third) as a clear guide to the cha-
otic products liability maze,4 or to reject it as a pro-defense,
industry-favoring curtailment of manufacturer liability.5
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Geography,
State University of New York at Buffalo, 1999. I would like to thank Anna, my fam-
ily, and friends for their love, support, and encouragement. I would especially thank
Associate Dean Gail Hollister for guiding me through all stages of this project's
development.
1. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1546 (1992)
(arguing that varying interpretations and inconsistent application of section 402(a) of
the Restatement (Second) have led to judicial disarray, necessitating the adoption of
the Restatement (Third), section 6(c)).
2. Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb. 2000) (declin-
ing to adopt section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third), in favor of section 402(a) of the
Restatement (Second)).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1997). This Note will focus
mainly on section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third).
4. See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1.
5. See generally George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1103-07 (2000) (criticizing
the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Restatement (Third)); Richard L.
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Few disagree that the Restatement (Third) radically changes the
nature of prescription drug design litigation.6 Critics of the Restate-
ment (Third) assert that the new standard sets a nearly impossibly
high threshold for plaintiffs seeking to hold prescription drug man-
ufacturers liable for defective design.7 One court has agreed,
describing the Restatement (Third) as setting a "[s]tandard that will
never allow liability [for the defective design of prescription
drugs]."8 Some critics argue that the Restatement (Third) effects
sweeping changes to prescription drug design litigation, and
"comes very close to eliminating design defect claims altogether."9
Other commentators argue that the Restatement (Third) is not a
true "restatement" of the law at all, but rather a complete
revision.10
The Restatement (Third)'s reporters respond that these changes
are not only justified, but necessary.1' The failure of the Restate-
ment (Second) in bringing about judicial uniformity has led courts
to carve out their own respective "niches" in the law.' 2 Due to
evolving notions of strict liability and its application to prescription
drug manufacturers, the analytical framework provided by the Re-
Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restate-
ment (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76
(1994); Theresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restate-
ment (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1364-68 (1994); Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a
Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261 (1997).
6. Hoffman-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d at 837; see also Ellen Wertheimer, The Third
Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1235, 1254-55 (1994); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1380. While this Note will often refer
to "prescription drugs," many courts have applied this doctrine to prescription medi-
cal devices as well. E.g., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984)
("[T]he decision to prescribe a cardiac pacemaker involves precisely the sort of indi-
vidualized medical balancing contemplated [by comment k of the Restatement (Sec-
ond)]."); Taylor v. Danek Medical, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *22-*23
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1998).
7. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1380.
8. Hoffman-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d at 839. This assertion may be too broad, as
under the Restatement (Third), a prescription drug manufacturer may still be held
strictly liable for the defective design of a prescription drug if no reasonable health
care provider would prescribe the drug to any class of patients. See infra notes 97-98
and accompanying text.
9. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1380. "The [Restatement (Third)'s reporters] said
that they did not want to eliminate design claims, but it seems that they have, in
effect, done so." Id. at 1385.
10. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 98; see also Vandall, supra note 5, at 272 (arguing
that the Restatement (Third)'s reporters ignored precedent when drafting it); Wert-
heimer, supra note 6, at 1254-57.
11. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1513.
12. Id. at 1528-29.
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statement (Second) is hopelessly out of date.13 According to the
reporters, "Anyone familiar with the law of products liability
knows that [the Restatement (Second)] requires revision. "14
Historically, safer alternative drug designs have often been un-
available. As a result, most prescription drug litigation has in-
volved failure to warn and manufacturing defect claims, as opposed
to claims that drugs have been defectively designed.15 In the past
two decades, however, courts have begun to take cognizance of de-
sign defect claims involving prescription drugs. 16 As courts are in-
creasingly confronted with claims of defectively designed
prescription drugs, they may look to the ALI for guidance on how
to proceed.
17
Courts and commentators have long debated the proper judicial
treatment of defective design claims involving prescription drugs.
Some commentators have argued that prescription drugs, as a
product category, are fundamentally different from other con-
sumer products. 18 A number of courts have agreed, citing a public
policy supporting the research and development of new prescrip-
tion drugs, and have sought to limit prescription drug manufacturer
liability for defective design.' 9 Other courts have refused to create
a bright-line distinction between all prescription drugs and other
consumer products.20 According to its 'reporters, the Restatement
(Third) clarifies murky judicial doctrine and reconciles these com-
13. Id. at 1513.
14. Id. at 1546.
15. Id. at 1537-38.
16. Id. at 1537 n.40 (citing Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1981), as the first prescription drug case raising a defective design claim).
17. Id. at 1512 (noting that courts have shown the Restatement (Second) "enor-
mous deference"). In the reporters' opinion, courts would afford the Restatement
(Third) same level of deference. Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1367 ("Courts
would undoubtedly give the new Restatement great weight, and in time [the Restate-
ment (Third)] would likely become the consensus, if not the universal, judicial stan-
dard for pharmaceutical liability."). But see Conk, supra note 5, at 98 ("[I]t seems
unlikely that courts will uniformly adopt the [Restatement (Third)] . . ").
18. E.g., Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988)
("[Tihere is an important distinction between prescription drugs and other prod-
ucts .... "); see also James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 170 (2001).
19. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 (holding manufacturers of prescription drugs im-
mune from strict liability claims on the basis of defective design). Contra Feldman v.
Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 380 (N.J. 1984) (holding manufacturers of defectively
designed prescription drugs strictly liable on the basis of defective design).
20. E.g., Feldman, 479 A.2d at 383 (rejecting bright-line distinction between pre-
scription drugs and other consumer products).
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peting viewpoints .2 Whether the ALI properly balances the socie-
tal utility of developing new prescription drugs against the need for
liability for defective drug designs has been hotly debated.
Part I of this Note will trace the history and evolution of strict
liability for defectively designed prescription drugs. This Part will
explore exactly what makes a prescription drug "defective," and
the standards adopted by the ALI in both the Restatement (Sec-
ond) and (Third) will be explained. In addition, Part I will high-
light the two competing methods by which different jurisdictions
apply the Restatement (Second) standard. While most jurisdictions
apply the Restatement (Second) to allow the imposition of strict lia-
bility on the basis of defective design against a prescription drug
manufacturer, 22 a sizeable minority of jurisdictions apply the Re-
statement (Second) to except prescription drug manufacturers from
strict liability on the basis of defective design. 3
Part II will discuss the current controversy regarding the Restate-
ment (Third), section 6(c), and the competing philosophies regard-
ing society's view of prescription drugs. Whether there should be a
bright-line distinction between prescription drugs and other con-
sumer goods will be explored, as well as the proper role of courts in
reviewing prescription drug designs. The role of the FDA regula-
tory process in reviewing prescription drug designs, and how that
role fits within the Restatements (Second) and (Third) will also be
explored. Having established the fundamental disagreements be-
tween the two Restatements, Part II will discuss the arguments in
favor and against the competing applications of both. Part II will
also describe several recent federal cases discussing the Restate-
ment (Third) in the context of defectively designed prescription
drug claims.
Part III will argue that the Restatement (Second), applied as it is
by the majority of jurisdictions, is preferable to the Restatement
(Third). Under the Restatement (Second), manufacturers of pre-
scription drugs that serve an important societal interest will be ex-
cepted from strict liability on the basis of defective design, while
21. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1513 ("[D]octrinal developments in
products liability have placed such a heavy gloss on the original text and comments to
[the Restatement (Second)] as to render them anachronistic . . . we hope to clarify
much of the confusion that has arisen over the years."). But see Wertheimer, supra
note 6, at 1255 ("[I]t is difficult to discern one consistent law of strict products liability
across the United States; indeed, it is arguably impossible. Thus, the task of restating
it ... fails before it begins.").
22. See infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
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manufacturers of less important drugs will remain strictly liable for
the defective design of their products. In contrast, the Restatement
(Third), by rejecting the judicial risk-utility review of prescription
drug designs, and deferring to the FDA regulatory process, rein-
forces an artificial distinction between prescription drugs and other
consumer products. Part III explains that as the paradigm em-
braced by the Restatement (Third) has not been followed by most
jurisdictions, the Restatement (Third) is an attempt by the ALI not
to clarify the current state of law, but to endorse the approach em-
ployed by a minority of courts.
I. THE EVOLVING PARADIGM OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
A. The Foundations of Strict Liability
The modern doctrine of strict products liability found its birth in
Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
after an exploding glass bottle of Coca-Cola injured a California
waitress's hand.24 While the California Supreme Court allowed the
plaintiff's negligence claim to reach the jury under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, Justice Traynor argued that the bottle's manufac-
turer should be held absolutely liable "[w]hen an article it has
placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspec-
tion, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings. 25
Justice Traynor continued:
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inher-
ent in defective products that reach the market .... It is to the
public interest to discourage the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public. If such products never-
theless find their way into the market it is to the public interest
to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause
upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the
market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and
however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occur-
rence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk
there should be general and constant protection and the manu-
facturer is best situated to afford such protection.
26
24. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
25. Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor's view was finally ac-
cepted in California when, almost twenty years after his concurring opinion in Escola,
2347
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The broad strokes of public policy painted by Justice Traynor
forged the path for the modern doctrine of strict products liabil-
ity.27 These groundbreaking arguments created a fundamental
shift in tort law, as under strict liability theory, a plaintiff need not
prove negligence on the part of a defendant in order to recover for
his injuries.28 The focus of the strict products liability inquiry is not
on the manufacturer's behavior, but on the product itself.29 To re-
cover under a strict products liability claim, the plaintiff need only
show that: (1) the product was defective; and (2) the defect was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 30 If the product is con-
sidered defective, the plaintiff may recover for his injuries, regard-
less of the care employed by the manufacturer of the product.31
Under strict products liability theory, a manufacturer may be
held strictly liable for three types of product defects - defective
manufacture, failure to warn, or defective design.32 A manufactur-
ing defect occurs when a product is not produced as the manufac-
turer intended. 33 In such a case, while the overall design of the
product may be sound, one specific manufactured unit is flawed,
causing injury to the user.34 A product may also be considered de-
fective when the manufacturer fails to provide adequate warnings
regarding the risks associated with using the product. In a failure
to warn case, a plaintiff need not prove that the product was defec-
tive in the traditional sense; a plaintiff need only show that the
manufacturer knew or should have known that use of the product
carries risks which the manufacturer failed to warn the plaintiff
he wrote the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1963), which expressly recognized a cause of action in strict liability.
27. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901 ("The purpose of [strict liability] is to insure that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are





32. See generally W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, 695-98 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. This Note will focus
only on design defects.
33. Id. at 695 (defining manufacturing defect as "an abnormality or a condition
that was unintended, and makes the product more dangerous than it would have been
as intended.").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 697 (stating "a product can be defective in the kind of way that makes it
unreasonably dangerous by . . . failing to adequately warn about a risk or hazard
related to the way a product is designed.").
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against. 36 In addition, even if produced exactly as the manufac-
turer intended and accompanied by adequate warnings, a product
may still be defective by design.37 Most early products liability
cases involving prescription drugs alleged failure to warn claims.38
However, courts have recently begun applying design defect theo-
ries to prescription drug manufacturers.39
Since before the adoption of the Restatement (Second), courts
have struggled with the issue of determining the existence of a de-
sign defect. To determine whether a product is defectively de-
signed, some courts analyze the product's performance according
to how safely the reasonable consumer would expect the product
to perform.40  If the product does not perform as safely as ex-
pected, the product is defectively designed.41 Under this "con-
sumer-expectation" test, a product is defective if it is "dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer who purchased it with the ordinary knowledge com-
mon to the community as to the product's characteristics. '4 2
Some courts have rejected the consumer-expectation test as a
means for determining a design defect.43 These courts determine
whether a product is defectively designed by measuring the prod-
uct's relative risks and benefits.44 Under this "risk-utility" analysis,
36. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1974); PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 32, at 697.
37. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 698.
38. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1537.
39. E.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981) (allowing
recovery under design defect claim against prescription drug manufacturer). Many
commentators cite Brochu as the first case allowing recovery under such a claim. See
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1537 n.40.
40. See, e.g., Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775, 779 (R.I. 1988)
(applying consumer-expectations test). Many courts, however, do not apply the con-
sumer-expectation test in cases involving prescription drugs. E.g., Shanks v. Upjohn
Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194-95 (Alaska 1992) (noting that in drug design cases, it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine the expectations of the "ordinary" consumer); Heath v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986) (finding that consumer-expecta-
tion test fails to adequately address issues involving technical or scientific informa-
tion), rev'd on other grounds, Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo.
1992). See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 698-99. But see Heath, 722 P.2d
at 419 (Lohr, J., dissenting) (arguing that consumer-expectation test essentially paral-
lels a risk-utility analysis).
41. Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 779; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 698.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. i (1965).
43. E.g., Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470, 477-78 (Cal. 1988)
(rejecting consumer expectation test in cases involving prescription drugs).
44. E.g., Heath, 722 P.2d at 414, rev'd on other grounds, Armentrout, 842 P.2d at
183 (applying risk-utility analysis); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 306 (Idaho
1987); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 382 (N.J. 1984).
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a product is defective if the magnitude of the dangers involved in
using the product outweigh its utility.45 Various courts have articu-
lated other factors to be considered in a risk-utility analysis.46
B. Design Defects Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
Section 402(a)
In 1965, the ALI adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts.47
Section 402(a) of the Restatement (Second) established a standard
under which a product's manufacturer was to be held strictly liable
if its product was sold in a "defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user."'48 Courts immediately seized upon section
402(a) as a convenient method of resolving design defect claims.49
45. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 32, at 699-700.
46. E.g., Heath, 722 P.2d at 414 (citing John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)). Professor Wade highlights
several factors in a risk-utility analysis, including: (1) usefulness and desirability of the
product; (2) safety aspects of the product; (3) availability of a safer alternative prod-
uct; (4) the manufacturer's ability to increase the product's safety without impairing
the product's usefulness, or making it too expensive; (5) the consumer's ability to
avoid danger by exercising a degree of care when using the product; (6) the user's
anticipated awareness of the inherent dangers in using the product; and (7) the feasi-
bility on the part of the manufacturer to spread potential losses. See also, Aaron D.
Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect
Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
521, 526 (1982).
47. See generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
48. Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402(a), titled "Special Liability of Seller
of Product For Physical Harm to User or Consumer," provides in part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although the seller has ex-
ercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965).
49. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1526-28. Many commentators ar-
gue that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) had not intended section 402(a) to
cover design defects. According to the Restatement (Third)'s reporters, this misappli-
cation of the Restatement (Second) led to the current judicial disarray of this area of
products liability law. "No one ... could have foreseen that language written prima-
rily to govern manufacturing defect cases might be used by courts in design and warn-
ing defect cases." Id.
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1. Comment k
Although the text of the Restatement (Second) seems to apply a
strict liability standard to the entire universe of manufactured
products, comment k to section 402(a) delineates an exception to
this rule, by excepting certain products deemed "unavoidably un-
safe" from strict liability on the basis of defective design.5° If a
product is deemed unavoidably unsafe, and thus falls within the
scope of comment k, the product's manufacturer will not be held
strictly liable on the basis of defective design.5 1 In a claim alleging
the defective design of a prescription drug, comment k allows the
manufacturer to escape strict liability if the risks of the prescription
drug were unavoidable. 52 Once falling under comment k's protec-
tions, the prescription drug manufacturer is not held strictly liable
on the basis of defective design.5 3  Courts that have been con-
50. Restatement (Second), section 402(a), comment k, titled "Unavoidably Unsafe
Products," provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since
the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoida-
ble high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly pre-
pared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs,
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be
no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwith-
standing a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again
with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to
strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely be-
cause he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a), cmt. k.
51. E.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) (explain-
ing the protections from strict liability afforded by comment k); Kearl v. Lederle
Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Brown v. Superior Court
(Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
52. E.g., Brochu, 642 F.2d at 657; Kearl, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 829; Belle Bonfils Mem'l
Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 125 (Colo. 1983) (noting that comment k prop-
erly applies to shield the manufacturer of an important, yet dangerous product, from
strict liability, as the importance of the product bears upon the reasonableness of the
risks involved).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a), cmt. b.
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fronted with claims of defectively designed prescription drugs have
generally adopted comment k.54
However, many courts disagree on the scope of prescription
drug products that comment k should protect. Most courts apply
comment k's protection from strict liability in a selective fashion,
excepting from strict liability only manufacturers of prescription
drugs deemed worthy of protection. Under this view, comment k
is treated as an affirmative defense, and the prescription drug's
manufacturer bears the burden of showing it should be applied to
the particular drug at issue.56 However, a sizeable minority of
courts apply comment k's protections to manufacturers of all pre-
scription drugs, excepting manufacturers of all prescription drugs
from strict liability on the basis of defective design.57
a. Case-by-Case Application of Comment k.
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued the initial landmark deci-
sion limiting comment k's application to a case-by-case analysis in
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories.58 After ingesting an antibiotic as
an infant, the plaintiff suffered severe tooth discoloration.59 Re-
jecting the manufacturer's argument that all prescription drugs
54. Comment k has been adopted by almost all jurisdictions that have applied
Section 402(a). See Brown, 751 P.2d at 476 (collecting cases). Contra Shanks v.
Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1197-98 (Alaska 1992) (declining to adopt comment k);
Collins v. Eli Lilly, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984).
55. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 540 (6th Cir. 1993);
Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989); Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co.,
764 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark.
1991); Kearl, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463 overruled by Brown, 751 P.2d at 470; Heath v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 722 P.2d 410, 415 (Colo. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, Armen-
trout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo. 1992); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d
297 (Idaho 1987); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 926 (Kan. 1990); Free-
man v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d 827, 837 (Neb. 2000); Feldman v. Lederle
Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d
775, 781 (R.I. 1988). For a detailed discussion of cases holding that comment k should
be applied in a selective fashion, see infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
56. E.g., Hansen, 665 P.2d at 122-23; Toner, 732 P.2d at 307; Castrignano, 546 A.2d
at 782 (holding that defendant manufacturer bears burden of pleading comment k as
an affirmative defense).
57. E.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding all
prescription drugs unavoidably unsafe); Brown, 751 P.2d at 470 (holding comment k's
protections from strict liability claims applicable to all prescription drugs); McKee v.
Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1982); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah
1991); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59 (Wash. 1996). For a detailed discussion
of cases that hold comment k applicable to manufacturers of all prescription drugs,
see infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
58. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
59. Id. at 377-79.
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were unavoidably unsafe, the court declined to hold comment k's
protections applicable to all prescription drug manufacturers.6 °
Rather, the court held that whether comment k would apply to the
prescription drug at issue would be determined on a case-by-case
basis.6' Only those prescription drugs that were "more vital to the
public health and human survival than others" would enjoy com-
ment k protection.62 Manufacturers of prescription drugs that
served society with less utility would be held strictly liable for the
defective design of their products.63
A California court of appeal followed New Jersey's analysis one
year later in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, when a plaintiff who
became paralyzed after receiving a polio vaccine sued the vaccine's
manufacturer for strict liability on the basis of defective design.64
Agreeing with the New Jersey Court's analysis in Feldman, the
court rejected the argument that prescription drug manufacturers
should be categorically excepted from strict liability on the basis of
defective design.65 Rather than apply comment k in blanket fash-
ion, excepting all prescription drug manufacturers from strict liabil-
ity on the basis of defective design, the court defined a "mini-trial"
procedure that would determine if comment k should apply.66
During this hearing, the trial court would determine whether com-
ment k should except the prescription drug's manufacturer from
strict liability.67 Under the Kearl analysis, whether the manufac-
turer of the prescription drug at issue would enjoy comment k's
protections would depend on several factors.68 The trial judge
60. Id. at 380, 383.
61. Id. at 383 (noting that "[Prescription] [d]rugs, like any other products, may
contain defects that could have been avoided by better manufacturing or design.").
62. Id. at 382.
63. Id.
64. Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Brown
v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
65. Id. at 463 ("[W]e are uncomfortable with the rather routine and mechanical
fashion by which many appellate courts have concluded that certain products, particu-
larly [prescription] drugs, are entitled to such special treatment.").
66. Id. at 463-64. For criticisms of the Kearl mini-trial approach, see Brown, 751
P.2d at 481-82.
67. Kearl, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
68. Id. The court identified a number of factors to be considered in a comment k
analysis:
A trial court should take evidence as to: (1) whether, when distributed, the
product was intended to confer an exceptionally important benefit that
made its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the then-existing risk
posed by the product was both 'substantial' and 'unavoidable'; and (3)
whether the interest in availability ... outweighs the interest in promoting
enhanced accountability through strict liability design defect review.
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would weigh these factors and determine if comment k should ap-
ply.6 9 While the court ultimately decided in the manufacturer's
favor, finding the vaccine to be unavoidably unsafe, the decision
signaled a marked affirmation of the principles laid out in
Feldman.7 °
Feldman and Kearl were soon followed by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Toner v. Lederle Laboratories.71 Answering certified
questions from the Ninth Circuit, the Idaho Supreme Court held
that whether comment k should except prescription drug manufac-
turers from strict liability on the basis of defective design should be
decided on a case-by-case basis. 71 The court identified several fac-
tors to be taken into account during a comment k analysis, similar
to the procedure outlined in Kearl.73 Expanding on the Kearl in-
quiry, the court gave great weight to determining whether there
existed a reasonable alternative design to the prescription drug at
issue.71 If a reasonable alternative design was available, the pre-
scription drug would not be considered unavoidably unsafe, com-
ment k would not apply, and the prescription drug's manufacturer
would be held strictly liable for defective design.75
Most jurisdictions have followed the Feldman line of cases, hold-
ing that comment k should except prescription drug manufacturers
from strict liability on the basis of defective design only when the
prescription drug serves an important social utility.76 While vari-
ous courts employ different procedures for implementing the com-
ment k analysis, most courts agree on the general proposition that
Id. Under the Kearl analysis, whether the risk was unavoidable hinged on whether the
product was designed to minimize its inherent risks to the extent possible when dis-
tributed, and the availability of an alternative product. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 463-64. Kearl was later overruled by the California Supreme Court in
Brown, 751 P.2d at 470.
71. Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho. 1987).
72. Id. at 308-09.
73. Id. at 305-06.
74. Id. The court defined several new factors to be recognized within a comment k
analysis, expanding upon the alternative design inquiry made in Kearl. Specifically,
the Toner court instructed lower courts to consider: (1) whether, at the time of the
prescription drug's distribution, no feasible alternative design existed that could repli-
cate the drug's purpose with a lesser risk; (2) the magnitude of the risks to be avoided
by adopting an alternative design; (3) the financial costs of the alternative design; (4)
the benefits of the alternative design; and (5) the relative safety of the prescription
drug in issue, compared to a potential alternative design. Id.
75. Id. at 306.
76. See supra note 55; see also Conk, supra note 5, at 1094-95 (noting the predomi-
nance of the Feldman line of cases).
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comment k should be applied selectively.77 Rather than advocating
a blanket application of comment k to manufacturers of all pre-
scription drugs, the majority of courts call for a case-by-case deter-
mination of whether the prescription drug at issue is worthy of
comment k protection.
b. Blanket Application of Comment k.
Shortly after the development of the Feldman line of cases, the
California Supreme Court overruled Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,
applying comment k's protections to manufacturers of all prescrip-
tion drugs.78 In Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories),
plaintiffs who had been exposed to the prescription drug DES sued
a number of drug manufacturers for strict liability on the basis of
defective design.79 The California Supreme Court declined to hold
the prescription drug manufacturer strictly liable, holding that re-
gardless of the prescription drug at issue, all prescription drug man-
ufacturers were to be excepted from strict liability on the basis of
defective design." Noting a distinction between prescription drugs
and other consumer products, the court asserted that the public
policy interests in the development of new prescription drugs mili-
tated against imposing strict liability.81 Besides overruling Kearl,
the Brown decision signaled a fundamental shift away from the
Feldman line of cases, toward a judicial policy of giving greater def-
erence to prescription drug manufacturers. Over time, this new
view has become a sizeable minority. 2
Three years later, Utah joined the minority, siding with Brown.83
The plaintiff alleged that she suffered severe psychological side ef-
fects after taking Halcion, a prescription drug used to treat insom-
77. Some courts have held the applicability of comment k to be a question of law
for the trial judge to decide. E.g., Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323-
24 (Kan. 1986). Other courts hold the issue to be strictly a question of fact for the
jury. E.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo. 1992). Still other courts
submit the issue to the jury only if reasonable minds could differ. E.g., Castrignano v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988).
78. Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
79. Id. at 473.
80. Id. at 482.
81. Id. at 478-79.
82. After the California Supreme Court's decision in Brown, several other juris-
dictions followed suit. E.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991);
Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996). See supra note 57.
83. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
nia, ultimately causing her to kill her mother.84 The plaintiff then
sued the prescription drug's manufacturer for strict liability on the
basis of defective design .8  The Supreme Court of Utah, answering
certified questions from a United States district court, held that
manufacturers of all FDA-approved prescription drugs fall within
the scope of comment k's protections.86 Reaffirming the public
policy interests asserted in Brown, and recognizing that it was ex-
panding the "literal and restrictive interpretation of comment k,"
the court held that manufacturers of all FDA-approved prescrip-
tion drugs were to be excepted from strict liability on the basis of
defective design.87 As Halcion was an FDA-approved prescription
drug, comment k automatically applied, and the prescription drug's
manufacturer was not held strictly liable.88
The Supreme Court of Washington, relying on the policy consid-
erations in Brown and the reasoning in Grundberg, embraced the
minority view.89 Holding comment k applicable to manufacturers
of all prescription drugs, the court rejected the case-by-case analy-
sis of Feldman and its progeny. 90 The court argued that by virtue of
the "character of the medical profession," and the fact that ob-
taining prescription drugs necessarily includes the involvement of a
physician, such a case-by-case analysis was unnecessary. 91 In the
court's opinion, the mere fact that prescription drugs require a pre-
scription illustrate the unavoidable risks inherent in their use. 92
Next to the Feldman line of cases, the Brown view is a minor-
ity.93 However, this view is an influential one. Shortly after the
development of the minority view, the ALl adopted Section 6(c) of
the Restatement (Third). While the Restatement (Third) seems to
84. Id. at 90. The potential side effects of Halcion include depression, psychosis,
depersonalization, aggressive assaultive behavior, and homicidal compulsion. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id. at 90, 95. For a discussion on FDA-approval as a complete exception from
strict liability on the basis of defective design, see infra Part II.B.
88. Id. at 95.
89. Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. ("As comment k notes, it is for this very reason that such drugs cannot be
legally sold except to physicians or under prescription by a physician; i.e., it is pre-
cisely because they are unavoidably unsafe to some degree that they are prescription
drugs.").
93. See supra note 57.
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establish a standard never seen before, its approach is remarkably
similar to the Brown view.94
C. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
Section 6(c)
In 1996, the ALI enacted the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability.95 According to the Restatement's reporters, the Re-
statement (Third) purports to completely change the face of
prescription drug design litigation.96 As with the Restatement (Sec-
ond), the Restatement (Third) provides for the imposition of strict
liability against a prescription drug manufacturer. 97 However, the
standard by which a prescription drug may be considered defec-
tively designed is radically different than under the majority view's
application of the Restatement (Second).98
94. For a discussion on the parallel reasoning employed by the Restatement
(Third) and the Brown line of cases, see infra Part II.
95. Many commentators criticize the circumstances surrounding the ALI's adop-
tion of the Restatement (Third). See generally Conk, supra note 5, at 1103-06 (noting
that the ALI adopted much of the Restatement (Third) with little debate or discus-
sion); Vandall, supra note 5.
96. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1545 ("[Comment k] is not an area
in which we can satisfy ourselves with a restatement of the case law. Case law that is
unintelligible cannot be intelligibly restated.").
97. Restatement (Third), section 6, titled "Liability of Commercial Seller or Dis-
tributor for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices" pro-
vides in part:
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or
otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to lia-
bility for harm to persons caused by the defect. A prescription drug or
medical device is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed
only pursuant to a health-care provider's prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug or
medical device is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the
drug or medical device:
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in Subsec-
tion (c); or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings as
defined in Subsection (d).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1997).
98. Restatement (Third), section 6(c) provides:
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to de-
fective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medi-
cal device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foresee-
able risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or med-
ical device for any class of patients.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c).
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Under the Restatement (Third), a prescription drug manufacturer
will be excepted from strict liability on the basis of defective design
if any reasonable health care provider would prescribe the drug to
any class of patients.99 Essentially, if a prescription drug confers a
benefit upon a small class of patients, while harming other classes,
it cannot be considered defectively designed. 1°° Some have argued
that the Restatement (Third) effectively creates a "reasonable phy-
sician" standard.101
In contrast to the Restatement (Second), the Restatement (Third)
creates an entirely new product category specifically for prescrip-
tion drugs and medical devices. 10 2 This represents a complete cate-
gorical distinction between prescription drugs and other consumer
products. 3 Under the Restatement (Third), claims of design de-
fects not involving prescription drugs are analyzed under a com-
pletely separate standard.0 4 Whereas under the Restatement
(Second), prescription drugs and other consumer products were
subject to the same standard, with comment k's exception for cer-
tain prescription drugs, the Restatement (Third) categorically dis-
99. Id.; see also id. § 6 cmt. f ("A prescription drug or device manufacturer defeats
a plaintiff's design claim by establishing one or more contexts in which its product
would be prescribed by reasonable, informed health-care providers . . . Given this
very demanding objective standard, liability is likely to be imposed only under unu-
sual circumstances.").
100. Id. § 6 cmt. f ("Subsection (c) reflects the judgment that, as long as a given
[prescription] drug or [medical] device provides net benefits for a class of patients, it
should be available to them .... "); see also Conk, supra note 5, at 1101-03 (noting
that the Restatement (Third) essentially establishes a "net benefit" test, whereby if a
prescription drug provides a net benefit, it is not considered defectively designed).
101. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1381-83; see also Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d
1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992) (rejecting comment k in favor of reasonable physician
standard).
102. Under the Restatement (Third), while claims of defectively designed prescrip-
tion drugs and medical devices are analyzed under section 6(c), claims of design de-
fects not involving prescription drugs are analyzed under section 2(b), a completely
different standard. Restatement (Third), section 2, titled "Categories of Product De-
fect," provides in part:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, . . . [the
product] is defective in design ... A product:
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a rea-
sonable alternative design ... and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2.
103. Id. § 6 cmt. b ("Because of the special nature of prescription drugs and medi-
cal devices, the determination of whether such products are not reasonably safe is to
be made under [section 6(c)] rather than under [section 2(b)]."); see also Conk, supra
note 5, at 1102.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS LIAB. § 6 cmt. b.
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tinguishes between prescription drugs and other consumer
products.10 5
In addition, the Restatement (Third) rejects the judicial risk-util-
ity analysis inherent in the application of the Restatement (Second)
embraced by the Feldman line of cases, in favor of the prescribing
physician's expertise. 6 If a reasonable physician determines a
prescription drug to have sufficient utility to warrant its prescrip-
tion, the prescription drug is not considered defectively
designed. 0 7
II. Restatement (Second) Versus Restatement (Third):
Paradigms In Conflict
Most states have not yet had the opportunity to consider the Re-
statement (Third) standard, and no state has yet formally adopted
it.108 Some courts have shown a reluctance to directly confront the
issue. 10 9 Recently, the Supreme Court of Nebraska explicitly re-
jected the Restatement (Third) standard, in the case of Freeman v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc." °
After the prescription drug Accutane caused her severe injuries,
the plaintiff sued the drug's manufacturer for strict liability on the
basis of defective design."' The manufacturer argued that as the
prescription drug had received FDA approval, it was automatically
excepted from strict liability on the basis of defective design.11 2
The trial court sustained the manufacturer's motion to dismiss, and
the plaintiff was given leave to amend." 3 After the plaintiff stood
on her original complaint, the action was dismissed with
prejudice." 4
105. Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1379-81.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b ("[P]rescribing
health-care providers . . . are able to assure that the right [prescription] drugs and
medical devices reach the right patients.").
107. Id. § 6 cmt. f ("A prescription drug or device manufacturer defeats a plaintiff's
design claim by establishing one or more contexts in which its product would be pre-
scribed by reasonable, informed health-care providers.").
108. See Paul A. Scrudato, Outside Counsel: Reassessing Liability for Defective De-
sign of Drugs, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 2001, at Al.
109. See, e.g., Wheat v. Sofamor, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1361 n.11 (N.D. Ga. 1999)
(declining to apply Restatement (Third), citing a complete absence of state precedent).
110. 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).
111. Id. at 832.
112. Id. at 833. Under then-existing state law, this argument was correct. McDaniel
v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822, 829 (Neb. 1976), overruled by Hoffman-La-
Roche, 618 N.W.2d at 837.
113. Hoffinan-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d at 832.
114. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska analyzed the plaintiff's defec-
tive design claim under the Restatement (Second) standard, and
held that the plaintiff's claim could proceed.'15 The court over-
ruled prior case law, and held that comment k should not except
manufacturers of all prescription drugs from strict liability on the
basis of defective design.' 16 The court rejected the argument that
providing blanket immunity to prescription drug manufacturers
was necessary.'17 The court also discussed the possibility of adopt-
ing the Restatement (Third) standard.1 1 8 Noting serious concerns
with the Restatement (Third) standard, the court declined to adopt
it.1
19
The opposing standards of the Restatement (Second) and (Third)
reflect serious disagreement regarding the proper state of prescrip-
tion drug manufacturer liability for defective drug design. This de-
bate, well-illustrated by the competing views regarding the
application of comment k, stems from fundamental disagreements
with the proposition that prescription drugs, as a product category,
are different from other consumer products. 120
Critics of prescription drug manufacturer design liability have
posed the argument that "prescription drugs are different" to jus-
tify the exclusion of design defect claims through both the Restate-
ment (Second) and Restatement (Third).12' Courts that adhere to
the view that all prescription drugs should be treated as a favored
product category have given effect to this view with a blanket ap-
plication of comment k. 22 Under this minority view, manufactur-
ers of all prescription drugs are excepted from strict liability on the
basis of defective design, regardless of the social utility of the pre-
scription drug at issue.1 23
On the other side of the debate, proponents of prescription drug
manufacturer design liability have sought to limit judicial distinc-
115. Id. at 840-41.
116. Id. at 837.
117. Id. at 836 ("[S]ocietal interests in ensuring the marketing and development of
prescription drugs will be adequately served without the need to resort to a rule of
blanket immunity.").
118. Id. at 837-41.
119. Id.
120. See generally Henderson & TWerski, supra note 18, at 170 (arguing that pre-
scription drugs, as a product category, are fundamentally different from other con-
sumer products).
121. See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1; see also, e.g., Brown v. Supe-
rior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988).
122. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 478; Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah
1991); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996).
123. Brown, 751 P.2d at 478; Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 94; Young, 922 P.2d at 64.
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tion between prescription drugs and other consumer products. 24
Courts that do not recognize prescription drugs as a favored prod-
uct category apply comment k's protections only to manufacturers
of prescription drugs that confer an important social utility.125 This
debate about the application of comment k is reflected in the con-
troversy over the ALI's adoption of the Restatement (Third). In
rejecting the Restatement (Third) and rethinking its blanket appli-
cation of comment k, the Nebraska Supreme Court discussed sev-
eral criticisms of both the Restatement (Second) and (Third)
standards, as well as the competing views of comment k.126 While
this area of law may now be settled in Nebraska, the issue is far
from clear in many other jurisdictions.
A. A Distinction With a Difference - Are Prescription Drugs
Fundamentally Different from Other
Consumer Products?
Some courts and commentators argue that prescription drugs, as
a product category, are more important to society than other con-
sumer products. 127 While most consumer products may provide
convenience or pleasure to their users, prescription drugs often
serve a more important societal need, such as the preservation of
life. 128 Accordingly, prescription drugs merit special attention, and
prescription drug manufacturers should not be held strictly liable
on the basis of defective design. 129 These courts apply comment k
124. E.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., Inc., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) (rejecting
categorical distinction between prescription drugs and other consumer products). See
generally Cupp, supra note 5, at 99 ("Prescription products are far from unique in
potentially benefiting one class of consumers while harming others.").
125. E.g., Feldman, 479 A.2d at 383 (restricting comment k's protections to pre-
scription drugs possessing an important societal utility).
126. Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d 827, 835-41 (Neb. 2000).
127. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 478 (addressing the distinction between prescription
drugs and other consumer products); see also Conk, supra note 5, at 1093 (noting that
the initial infrequency of defective design claims involving prescription drugs served
to reinforce the idea that prescription drugs were a favored class of product, and
should not be subject to strict liability); M. Stuart Madden, The Enduring Paradox of
Products Liability Law Relating to Prescription Pharmaceuticals, 21 PACE L. REV.
313, 318 (2001) (arguing that societal recognition of the importance of prescription
drugs militates against imposing strict liability).
128. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 478 ("[Consumer products are] used to make work
easier or to provide pleasure, while [prescription drugs] ... alleviate pain and suffer-
ing .... "); Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95-96 (noting unique characteristics of prescription
drugs).
129. See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 480; Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 94; Young v. Key
Pharms. Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996).
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in blanket fashion, following the Brown line of cases. 130 The Re-
statement (Third) continues this approach, treating prescription
drugs as a favored product category, and excepting prescription
drug manufacturers from strict liability on the basis of defective
design.13 1
Despite the development of the Brown line of cases, and the sub-
sequent adoption of the Restatement (Third), most courts reject this
view. Courts following the Feldman line of cases decline to recog-
nize a bright-line distinction between all prescription drugs and
other consumer products. These courts argue that since not all pre-
scription drugs confer an important benefit to society, prescription
drugs should not be treated as a favored class of product.132 Ac-
cordingly, not all manufacturers of prescription drugs should be ex-
cepted from strict liability on the basis of defective design.133
1. The Restatement (Third)'s Distinction
The Restatement (Third)'s view that prescription drugs are fun-
damentally "different" from other consumer products is evident
from the text and comments of section 6. Additionally, the distinc-
tion is demonstrated by the fact that the Restatement (Third) ana-
lyzes design defect claims not involving prescription drugs under
section 2(b), while defect claims involving prescription drugs are
analyzed under section 6(c). 13 4 Such a categorical distinction indi-
cates the Restatement (Third)'s view that prescription drugs consti-
tute a favored class of product, and deserve protection from strict
liability.
According to the Restatement (Third), each type of prescription
drug poses a "unique set of risks and benefits." 13  As such, it is
improper to judicially determine that a particular prescription
130. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 480; Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 94; Young, 922 P.2d at 64.
See supra note 57.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) cmt. b (1997); see also
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1545.
132. E.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting com-
plete distinction between prescription drugs and other consumer products); Toner v.
Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho. 1987); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d
374, 383 (N.J. 1984).
133. Toner, 732 P.2d at 308 ("[Comment k should not] provide all ethical drugs with
blanket immunity from strict liability design defect claims.").
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LtAB. § 2(b); Id. § 6(c) cmt. b.
135. Id. § 6(c); accord Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 ("[Tlhe advantages of a [prescription]
drug cannot be isolated from the condition of a particular patient."); Grundberg, 813
P.2d at 95-96 (Utah 1991) ("Because prescription drugs are chemical compounds de-
signed to interact with the chemical and physiological processes of the human body,
they will almost always pose some risk of side effects in certain individuals.").
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drug's design is "defective," as the drug may interact differently
with each patient.136 Unless the prescription drug at issue would
provide no net benefit to any class of patients, it cannot be consid-
ered defectively designed. 137 Under the Restatement (Third), a pre-
scription drug that will cure one class of patients, but seriously
injure another class, is not defective, since the drug has conferred a
sufficient benefit. 138
The Restatement (Third) also draws heavily on the learned inter-
mediary concept in its distinction between prescription drugs and
other consumer products. 39 In contrast to other consumer goods,
prescription drugs are obtained through the help of a learned inter-
mediary, who can make knowledgeable decisions as to a particular
prescription drug's risks and efficacy for a specific patient.140 Pro-
ponents of the Restatement (Third) argue that the involvement of a
learned intermediary makes imposing strict liability on prescription
drug manufacturers unnecessary.14 1
2. The Minority Regime's Distinction
Adhering to the view that prescription drugs, as a product cate-
gory, are different than other consumer goods, courts following the
Brown line of cases apply comment k's protections to manufactur-
ers of all prescription drugs.142 The Brown court recognized this
136. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1536; see also Grundberg, 813 P.2d
at 95; Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996). As the Restatement
(Third) soundly rejects judicial review of prescription drug designs, it necessarily de-
fers to the regulatory framework of the FDA. See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of
the FDA's role in reviewing prescription drug designs.
137. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1538 ("It appears elementary that
so long as a group exists for whom the drug in question is the drug of choice, then the
issue of design has no place in the applicable liability law.").
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. f.
139. Id. § 6 cmt. b ("The rationale supporting this 'learned intermediary' rule is that
only health-care professionals are in a position to understand the significance of the
risks involved and to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given form
of prescription-based therapy."). In support of a bright-line distinction between pre-
scription drugs and other consumer products, the Restatement (Third) also takes note
of the extensive regulatory system provided by the FDA to governing the distribution
of prescription drugs. Id. For a discussion of the Restatement (Third)'s deference to
the FDA, see infra Part II.B.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b; see also Hender-
son & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1538.
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. f; see also Hen-
derson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1538-39.
142. E.g., Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (hold-
ing comment k applicable to all manufacturers of prescription drugs); Grundberg v.
Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991); Young v. Key Pharms. Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64
(Wash. 1996).
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distinction by noting that while most consumer products are used
merely for pleasure or convenience, prescription drugs often "save
lives and reduce pain and suffering."' 43 Unlike other consumer
products, harm resulting from using prescription drugs might be
unavoidable.144
Supporting the Brown line of cases, many commentators agree
with the view that prescription drugs are different from other con-
sumer products. 4 5 For example, while many consumer goods may
be redesigned to increase their safety, prescription drugs are often
limited to a singular chemical structure, rendering them incapable
of redesign. 46 Accordingly, this limitation bolsters the argument
that prescription drugs are unavoidably unsafe.
Further, proponents of a distinction between prescription drugs
and other consumer products argue that holding prescription drug
manufacturers strictly liable for defective design does not serve the
interests of public policy. 147 Many have noted that public policy
demands the timely development and marketing of beneficial pre-
143. Brown, 751 P.2d at 478.
144. Id.; Grundberg, 831 P.2d at 95 ("[Prescription drugs] will almost always pose
some risk of side effects in certain individuals"); Young, 922 P.2d at 64 ("Some prod-
ucts are necessary regardless of the risks involved to the user.").
145. See generally Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and
the Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 209-15
(1999). Professor Green highlights four reasons why prescription drugs are distin-
guished from other consumer products: (1) Prescription drugs are highly regulated by
the FDA; (2) prescription drugs have a high social utility; (3) prescription drugs are
chosen with the assistance of a physician; and (4) prescription drugs that are harmful
to some consumers produce benefits to others.
146. See generally Green, supra note 145, at 232 ("Drugs are different because they
cannot be manipulated physically to provide marginally greater safety."); Henderson
& TWerski, supra note 1, at 1545-56. But see Brown, 751 P.2d at 478 ("[W]e seriously
doubt [defendant's] claim that a drug like DES cannot be 'redesigned' to make it
safer."); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988) (arguing
that the chemical redesign argument is too narrow, as there may be alternative pre-
scription drugs available that could replace the prescription drug at issue with less side
effects); see also Green, supra note 145, at 208. However, Professor Green notes that
prescription drug manufacturers are increasingly able to engineer drugs, "so as con-
sciously to modify their molecular structure to weed out adverse effects while retain-
ing therapeutic benefits." Id. at 213. This process will become increasingly possible
through further technological advances. Id.
147. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 478-79 (outlining reasons why holding prescription
drug manufacturers strictly liable for design defects contravenes public policy);
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 94. While the Utah Supreme Court held that prescription drug
manufacturers should be excepted from strict liability on the basis of design solely by
virtue of the FDA regulatory framework, the court nevertheless agreed with the pol-
icy considerations outlined in Brown. Id. at 95.
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scription drugs, and many argue that the public welfare is best
served by making prescription drugs as affordable as possible.'48
The California Supreme Court asserted that holding prescription
drug manufacturers strictly liable for design defects could cause
manufacturers to delay the release of important prescription
drugs.'49 If prescription drug manufacturers could be held strictly
liable on the basis of defective design, they would be more likely to
delay the ultimate release of prescription drugs to the market in
order to extend clinical testing.150 Such a potential delay would be
against public policy interests, as the interests of society "favor[]
the development and marketing of beneficial new drugs. 151
The Brown court also argued that holding prescription drug
manufacturers strictly liable for design defects would dissuade
them from researching beneficial new prescription drugs. 52 In the
court's view, if a prescription drug manufacturer faced strict liab-
lilty for potential design choices made when developing a new pre-
scription drug, the manufacturer, fearing adverse judgments, would
not likely undertake development of the drug. 153
The court also asserted that imposing strict liability would in-
crease the financial pressures on prescription drug manufactur-
ers.154 These financial pressures would likely come in the form of
increased expenses from defending against lawsuits, as well as the
additional costs of insurance. 55 Imposing these increased expenses
upon prescription drug manufacturers would run counter to the
public policy interests in the wide availability of prescription drugs,
as the increased costs borne by prescription drug manufacturers
148. Brown, 751 P.2d at 479.
149. Id.
150. Id. ("Perhaps a drug might be made safer if it was withheld from the market
until scientific skill and knowledge advanced to the point at which additional danger-




153. Id. In outlining the reasons for excepting prescription drug manufacturers
from strict liability on the basis of defective design, the Brown court cited Dean
Prosser:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products
should make good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add the
cost to the price of the product, encounters reason for pause, when we con-
sider that two of the greatest medical boons to the human race, penicillin
and cortisone, both have their dangerous side effects, and that drug compa-
nies might well have been deterred from producing and selling them.
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could discourage them from developing valuable new prescription
drugs.156 Due to these additional expenses, imposing strict liability
on prescription drug manufacturers "could place the cost of medi-
cation beyond the reach of those who need it most." '157
3. The Majority View Rejects the Distinction
Most courts have rejected such an abrupt conceptual schism be-
tween prescription drugs and other consumer products. 58 Courts
following the Feldman line of cases recognize that some prescrip-
tion drugs do confer an especially important societal benefit, and
the manufacturers of those prescription drugs should be excepted
from strict liability on the basis of defective design. 5 9 Under this
view, however, not all prescription drugs have the same societal
value.16 ° As such, courts should not treat prescription drugs as a
favored product category, excepting all prescription drug manufac-
turers from strict liability on the basis of defective design.161
The Eighth Circuit has held that the public policy arguments
concerning strict liability for defective design are equally applica-
ble to other products possessing "life-bettering" characteristics. 162
Many other consumer products, not excepted from strict liability,
provide risks and benefits similar to prescription drugs.163 Simi-
larly, prescription drugs are not the only products that may provide
some net benefit to a class of users, without the same benefit to
other users.1 64 Accordingly, there is little reason to completely dis-
156. Id. at 479-80.
157. Id. at 479 (noting that the prescription drug Benedictin, the only anti-nauseant
drug available for pregnant women, was withdrawn from the market due to increased
insurance costs).
158. E.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting com-
plete distinction between prescription drugs and other consumer products); Toner v.
Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d
374, 383 (N.J. 1984); see also Cupp, supra note 5, at 99-103.
159. E.g., Feldman, 479 A.2d at 382.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Hill, 884 F.2d at 1069; accord Shanks v. Upjohn, 835 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Alaska
1992).
163. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 99.
164. See id. at 101. Professor Cupp employs an analogy where an automobile manu-
facturer designs an automobile with minimal safety features to minimize price. While
there may exist a class of users to whom this product is ideal, strict liability on the
basis of defective design would not be precluded merely because some class of users
benefits from the dangerous design. See also Green, supra note 145, at 215 ("[N]o
court would automatically rule out liability for a redesigned version of these products
to meet the needs of these groups merely because a minority of consumers are made
better off by the design.").
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tinguish all prescription drugs from other consumer products.165
Such a forced distinction between prescription drugs and other
consumer products creates an artificial schism in favor of prescrip-
tion drug manufacturers. 1
66
In Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that although prescription drugs are valuable to the
public, there was no justification for excepting all prescription drug
manufacturers from strict liability for defective design.167  The
court noted that "[prescription] [d]rugs, like any other products,
may contain defects that could have been avoided by better manu-
facturing or design" and concluded that comment k should not ex-
cept manufacturers of all prescription drugs from strict liability.
168
Rather than treat all prescription drugs as members of a favored
class, the court noted the similarities between prescription drugs
and other consumer products. 69
Disagreeing with the Brown court, many courts have held that
imposing strict liability for the defective design of some prescrip-
tion drugs is appropriate. 170 The New Jersey Supreme Court has
held that imposing strict liability for design defects may be appro-
priate when a transaction is product-oriented, such as the distribu-
tion of prescription drugs, as opposed to a service-oriented
transaction, such as the direct service provided by a doctor.1 71 The
court noted that prescription drug manufacturers place their goods
into the stream of commerce, like manufacturers of other con-
sumer goods. 172 While certain prescription drugs may be valuable
to society, prescription drug manufacturers are essentially profit-
165. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 382 ("The evidence does not demonstrate why the
drug-manufacturing industry should be placed in a different category from other man-
ufacturers and suppliers of mass-produced products in which the enterprise bear the
liability for a product that is not fit, suitable, or safe for its intended use.").
166. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 99 ("A weakness in [the categorical distinction be-
tween prescription drugs and other consumer products] is that it could be applied to
countless other products that the new Restatement does not immunize from liabil-
ity."); Vandall, supra note 5, at 271.
167. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 382.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. E.g., Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 459-63 (Ct. App. 1985), over-
ruled by Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Feldman,
479 A.2d at 380 (holding strict liability principles applicable to prescription drug
manufacturers).
171. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 381-82 ("[Prescription] [d]rug manufacturers, unlike
doctors and dentists, do not render to consumers professional services involving skills
in judgment and diagnosis.").
172. Id. at 382.
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making enterprises, and should be held strictly liable for the defec-
tive design of their products. 73
Some courts have taken issue with the Brown court's assertions
that imposing strict liability on the manufacturers of prescription
drugs would contravene public policy. 174 Rather, courts following
the Feldman line of cases have asserted that holding prescription
drug manufacturers strictly liable on the basis of defective design
will further the policy interests of the timely development of new
drugs.175 Some commentators have asserted that imposing strict li-
ability upon prescription drug manufacturers for design defects will
result in the development of safer prescription drugs.1 76 If a pre-
scription drug manufacturer faces strict liability on the basis of de-
fective design, it will have an incentive to improve its products.177
In contrast, if the manufacturer will not be strictly liable for defec-
tive design, it will have little incentive to improve the design of its
products, other than competitive market pressures. 178 Accordingly,
a selective application of comment k will encourage, rather than
discourage, the research and development of new prescription
drugs.
Several courts following the Feldman line of cases have empha-
sized the point that a selective application of comment k strikes an
effective balance between a manufacturer's responsibility and the
encouragement of research and development of new prescription
173. Id.; see also, e.g., Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1.164-68 (Cal. 1984)
(Bird, C.J., dissenting) (outlining reasons strict liability principles are generally appli-
cable to prescription drug manufacturers).
174. See Shanks v. Upjohn, 835 P.2d 1189, 1196 n.8 (Alaska 1992) (disagreeing with
the California Supreme Court's findings that imposing strict liability on the manufac-
turers of prescription drugs would adversely affect the availability and price of pre-
scription drugs). The Alaska Supreme Court also noted that while the court in Brown
claimed such adverse effects would result from imposing strict liability, the California
Supreme Court stated, "[w]e are aware of only one decision that has applied the doc-
trine of strict liability to prescription drugs." Brown, 751 P.2d at 476 (citing Brochu v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-57 (1st Cir. 1981)). As claims against prescrip-
tion drug manufacturers have been grounded in claims other than strict liability in the
past, it is unclear exactly how the Brown court was able to establish a nexus between
increased costs and the imposition of strict liability. See Shanks, 825 P.2d at 1195 n.8.
175. Finn, 677 P.2d at 1165 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that imposing strict
liability against prescription drug manufacturers would not delay the development
and marketing of new prescription drugs).
176. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
177. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting); see also Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d
728, 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 589 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1991).
178. Finn, 677 P.2d at 1165 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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drugs.179 Most courts have agreed, holding that the interests of de-
veloping new prescription drugs will be served without the need to
provide blanket immunity from strict liability claims to prescription
drug manufacturers.18 Under this view, manufacturers of prescrip-
tion drugs that serve society with an important utility deserve to be
excepted from strict liability claims on the basis of defective design,
while manufacturers of less important prescription drugs will be
held strictly liable.
Many proponents of the Feldman line of cases have also rejected
the argument that prescription drug manufacturers are incapable
of redesigning drugs to increase their safety.1 81 Prescription drugs
may often be available in different recommended dosages or com-
binations, to increase safety without sacrificing efficacy. 182 In many
instances, an alternative prescription drug is available, that will af-
ford the same benefits as the drug in issue, with less risk of harm.1 83
Under the Feldman view, this fact creates less of a reason to view
all prescription drugs as a favored product category.
B. Risk-Utility Design Review and the Role of the FDA
The competing views of the Restatement (Second) and (Third), as
well as the opposing applications of comment k, illustrate the di-
verging view of the two regimes regarding judicial risk-utility re-
view of prescription drug designs. The Restatement (Third) takes
the position that courts should not engage in the judicial review of
prescription drug designs.1 84 Courts following the Brown line of
cases agree with the Restatement (Third), and apply comment k in
179. E.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Neb. 2000).
180. E.g., Hill, 884 F.2d at 1069 ("[O]nly exceptional products ... should be ex-
cluded from the strict liability provisions [by comment k]."); Toner v. Lederle Labs.,
732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987).
181. See generally Cupp, supra note 5, at 94; Green, supra note 145, at 211-16.
Many commentators also note that most prescription medical devices may be, and
often are, redesigned to increase their safety. Id. at 213; see also Castrignano v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988).
182. E.g., Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988)
("[The court] seriously doubt[s] [defendant's] claim that a [prescription drug] cannot
be 'redesigned' to make it safer."); Toner, 732 P.2d at 308; Castrignano, 546 A.2d at
781 (discussing the availability of alternative prescription drugs that cause no side
effects, which could replace a defective drug); see also Green, supra note 145, at 213
(noting that technological advancements have enabled the engineering of drugs, on
the molecular level, to eliminate adverse effects).
183. Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 781.
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1997); see also
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1536 ("[I]n our view, courts should not review
the adequacy of prescription drug designs.").
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blanket fashion, excepting all prescription drug manufacturers
from strict liability on the basis of defective design. 185 However,
most courts, following the Feldman line of cases, argue that courts
are competent to review prescription drug designs. 186 These courts
apply comment k selectively, excepting from strict liability only
manufacturers of those prescription drugs that supply an important
social need. 187
In addition, the two regimes hold competing views regarding the
proper role of the FDA in reviewing prescription drug designs.
The Restatement (Third) places a great deal of faith in the role of
FDA regulation. 88 Some courts have explicitly deferred to the
FDA-approval process, and have declined to hold manufacturers of
FDA-approved prescription drugs strictly liable on the basis of de-
fective design. 89 Other courts, while not explicitly deferring to the
regulatory process, have implicitly agreed with this result.190 How-
ever, most courts have held that FDA approval should not prevent
judicial risk-utility review of prescription drug designs, or prevent a
finding that a prescription drug has been defectively designed. 191
1. The Restatement (Third)'s Rejection of Review
The Restatement (Third) soundly rejects judicial risk-utility re-
view of prescription drug designs.1 92 The Restatement (Third)'s re-
porters argue that courts are improper arenas to evaluate
prescription drug designs.1 93 Because courts should not engage in
the design review of prescription drugs, prescription drugs of vary-
ing social utilities are treated as a favored product category.
185. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 470 (rejecting risk-utility review of prescription drug
designs); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991); Young v. Key Pharms.,
Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996).
186. E.g., Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463-64 (Ct. App. 1985) (ac-
cepting risk-utility review of prescription drug designs), overruled by Brown, 751 P.2d
470; Toner, 732 P.2d at 308-09; Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J.
1984).
187. E.g., Kearl, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464 ("[S]ome special highly beneficial and yet
inherently risky products may be deemed unavoidably dangerous and hence exempt
from strict products liability design defect analysis.").
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b.
189. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.
190. Brown, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12; Young, 922 P.2d at 64.
191. Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prod., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1993); Hill v.
Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d
1189, 1197 n.10 (Alaska 1992); Toner, 732 P.2d at 311 n.12; Savina v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 931 (Kan. 1990); Feldman, 479 A.2d at 390-92.
192. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1536.
193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b; see also Hen-
derson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1536.
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However, the Restatement (Third) does allow for risk-utility re-
view, albeit in a different arena. Rather than allow a trial court to
determine if a prescription drug was defectively designed, the Re-
statement (Third) limits that determination to the prescribing physi-
cian.' 94 Under the Restatement (Third) standard, if a reasonable
prescribing physician would prescribe the drug at issue, it is not
considered defectively designed.195
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) relies heavily on the FDA's
regulation of prescription drugs, without explicitly deferring to the
FDA approval process. 196 Under the Restatement (Third), an
FDA-approved prescription drug is not automatically excepted
from strict liability. 197 As a practical matter, however, the Restate-
ment (Third) standard demands this result.1 98 The Restatement
(Third) holds that a prescription drug is not considered defective if
any reasonable health care provider would provide the prescription
drug to any class of patients. 99 Some commentators argue that as
prescription drugs require FDA-approval, and a particular pre-
scription drug will not receive FDA-approval if it provides no net
benefit, it is unlikely that an FDA-approved prescription drug
could provide so little utility that no reasonable health care pro-
vider would prescribe it.2 00
Under the Restatement (Third) view, the regulatory framework
provided by the FDA to govern the distribution of prescription
drugs adequately reviews prescription drugs for defective de-
signs.20 1 The Restatement (Third)'s reporters note that the FDA
approval process is lengthy and comprehensive; no trial court could
effectively replicate such a procedure.2 °2 As a consequence, once a
194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. f.
195. Id.
196. The text of section 6 does not refer to the FDA-approval process. In fact, the
reporters note that, "[U]nqualified deference to these regulatory mechanisms is con-
sidered by a growing number of courts to be unjustified." Id. § 6 cmt. b.
197. Id. § 6 cmt. f.
198. See id. § 6 cmt. b. See generally Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1397.
199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c).
200. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1383-84.
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b ("[T]he regulatory
system governing prescription drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting the stan-
dards for drug design ... governmental regulatory agencies adequately review new
prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous designs off the mar-
ket."); see also Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah 1991).
202. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1538. The California Supreme
Court noted a similar concern in Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d
470 (Cal. 1988). While the Brown court did not base its holding completely on the fact
that prescription drugs are regulated by the FDA, the court noted the inadequacy of
2371
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
prescription drug has received FDA-approval, a subsequent judi-
cial proceeding to search for a defect within a prescription drug is
unnecessary. °3
2. The Minority's Rejection of Risk-Utility Review
Many courts following the minority view refuse to recognize the
capacity of trial courts to engage in the risk-utility review of pre-
scription drug designs. 214 The arguments for applying comment k
in blanket fashion, excepting manufacturers of all prescription
drugs from strict liability on the basis of defective design were first
set out in Brown.20 5 The California Supreme Court, holding that
prescription drugs differ fundamentally from other consumer prod-
ucts, declined to recognize a difference in social utility between dif-
ferent prescription drugs. 20 6 The court initially noted that such a
distinction would be ideal.20 7 However, categorizing prescription
drugs according to social utility would interfere with the policy rea-
sons for excepting prescription drug manufacturers from strict lia-
bility claims.20 8 Simply attempting to distinguish different
prescription drugs according to their social utility would impair the
public's interest in the development and marketing of new drugs.20 9
In rejecting the mini-trial hearing defined in Kearl, the California
Supreme Court also expressed a concern that performing a sepa-
rate comment k analysis to every prescription drug could lead to
disparate results, as different trial judges would likely come to dif-
ferent conclusions. 210 As a result, prescription drug manufacturers
would have no way to gauge the prospective level of liability that
the judicial arena for reviewing prescription drug designs, because of the possibility of
inconsistent decisions by different trial judges. Id. at 482.
203. See Hon. William A. Dreier, Manufacturer Liability for Drugs and Medical
Devices Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 30 SETON HALL
L. REV. 258, 262 (1999) ("It certainly does not aid the tort system to turn each tort
trial into a mini-FDA application procedure.").
204. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 481 (holding that the Kearl analysis, which took into
account the social utility of prescription drugs, would "substantially impair[ ] the pub-
lic interest in the development and marketing of new drugs, because the harm to this
interest arises in the very process of attempting to make the distinction."); accord
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95; Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996).
205. Brown, 751 P.2d at 479-80.
206. Id. at 481-82.
207. Id. at 481 ("It seems unjust to grant the same protection from liability to those
who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin.").
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 482.
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would attach with its product.211 In the court's view, this level of
uncertainty would be unacceptable and would go against the policy
reasons for protecting prescription drug manufacturers from liabil-
ity.212 Some commentators have gone so far as to argue that the
text itself of comment k should be read to encompass all prescrip-
tion drugs, excepting all manufacturers from strict liability on the
basis of defective design.1 3
Few courts under the minority view have explicitly held that an
FDA-approved prescription drug cannot be considered defectively
designed. However, courts following the Brown line of cases, ap-
plying comment k to all prescription drug manufacturers, implicitly
agree with the Restatement (Third)'s view.214 While these courts do
not explicitly defer to the FDA, they support the Restatement
(Third)'s argument that courts should defer to the regulatory pro-
cess when hearing claims involving prescription drug designs.21 5
In Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., the Utah Supreme Court explicitly
excepted all manufacturers of FDA-approved prescription drugs
from strict liability on the basis of defective design. 16 The court
noted the extensive regulatory system provided by the FDA.217 In
the court's opinion, a trial court is not the proper forum to deter-
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Compare id. at 482 n.11 (holding that comment k "was intended to and should
apply to all prescription drugs."), with Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96
(Utah 1991) (disapproving of the Brown court's interpretation of the language of
comment k, but approving of the policy implications behind the result). But see Cupp,
supra note 5, at 99-103 (arguing that since comment k has proven difficult to interpret,
it should not be read so broadly).
214. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1997)
("Courts have also recognized that the regulatory system governing prescription
drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting the standards for drug design."), with
Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 n.12; Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 97; Young v. Key Pharms., Inc.,
922 P.2d 59, 64-65 (Wash. 1996).
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b; see also
Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 n.12; Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 97; Young, 922 P.2d at 64-65.
216. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 99 (extending "broad grant of immunity from strict
liability claims based on design defects" to manufacturers of FDA-approved prescrip-
tion drugs).
217. Id. at 96. In excepting all manufacturers of FDA-approved prescription drugs
from strict liability on the basis of defective design, the Utah Supreme Court noted:
Before licensing a new medication, the FDA employs an extensive screening
mechanism to ensure that the potential benefits of the product outweigh any
associated risks . . . The new drug approval process can require years of
testing and review ... [t]he FDA also conducts extensive post-market sur-
veillance ... We find this extensive regulatory scheme capable of and appro-
priate for making the preliminary determination regarding whether a
prescription drug's benefits outweigh its risks.
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mine whether a particular prescription drug is defective.218 While
most courts have not gone as far as Grundberg, courts following
the Brown line of cases agree with the Utah Supreme Court's rea-
soning.21 9 Applying comment k's protections to all prescription
drug manufacturers, courts following the minority view reject trial
courts as arenas inadequate to evaluate prescription drug
designs.22°
While the California Supreme Court did not base its holding in
Brown on the FDA's regulation of prescription drugs, the court
nevertheless rejected the trial court as a forum for determining ad-
equate prescription drug designs.221 The Washington Supreme
Court implicitly agreed, holding that, "[I]t is precisely because
[prescription drugs] are unavoidably unsafe to some degree that
they are prescription drugs. '222
3. The Majority's Endorsement of Risk-Utility Review
Many commentators, and courts following the Feldman line of
cases, argue that a prescription drug's social utility should be a fac-
tor in determining whether the manufacturer of the prescription
drug will be excepted from strict liability on the basis of defective
design.223 While some prescription drugs, such as lifesaving vac-
cines, serve a large social utility, many other prescription drugs,
such as so-called cosmetic drugs, confer only a small benefit upon
society.224 Accordingly, as prescription drugs vary according to so-
cial utility, not all manufacturers of prescription drugs deserve to
be excepted from strict liability on the basis of defective design. 225
As such, courts adhering to this view apply comment k in a selec-
tive fashion, excepting from strict liability on the basis of defective
design only those manufacturers of prescription drugs deemed im-
portant to society.226
218. Id. at 98.
219. E.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 (holding comment k applicable to all prescription
drug manufacturers, and rejecting the trial court as the proper forum for the evalua-
tion of prescription drug designs); Young, 922 P.2d at 64.
220. Brown, 751 P.2d at 482; Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 98.
221. Brown, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12 ("It should also be noted that the consumer of
prescription drugs are afforded greater protection against [design] defects than con-
sumers of other products, since 'the drug industry is closely regulated by the
[FDA] ....') (citing Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 935 (Cal. 1980)).
222. Young, 922 P.2d at 64.
223. E.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d 827, 839 (Neb. 2000).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 55.
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In Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, the Nebraska Supreme Court
found the Restatement (Third) standard inflexible, noting that it
treats all prescription drugs equally, with no regard to societal util-
ity.227 The court noted that under the Restatement (Third), a cos-
metic drug that has very little utility will be protected from strict
liability design review to the same degree as a life saving vaccine. 228
The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed, holding that while the social
utility of prescription drugs as a product category may outweigh
other consumer products, individual prescription drugs differ in so-
cial value. 229 The court expressed concern with "granting 'the same
protection from liability to those who gave us thalidomide as to the
producers of penicillin.'" 230
A California appellate court took the same view in Kearl v. Led-
erie Laboratories, holding that comment k should serve to except
from strict liability on the basis of defective design only those pre-
scription drugs that possess an important social utility. 231 The ma-
jority noted that several important factors called for a distinction
between prescription drugs worthy of comment k's protection and
those subject to strict liability, such as whether a safer alternative
was available.232
Many courts have rejected a blanket application of comment k
as not in keeping with the purpose behind the comment.233 In re-
jecting the argument that comment k should except all prescription
drugs from strict liability on the basis of defective design, the
Eighth Circuit defined the purpose of comment k as "protect[ing]
defendants who supply critically needed but potentially harmful
products ....234 Courts have argued that the language of com-
ment k itself suggests that only exceptional products, which meet
an important social need will fall under the comment's
protections.235
227. Hoffman-LaRoche, 618 N.W.2d at 839.
228. Id.
229. Shanks v. Upjohn, 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992).
230. Id. (quoting Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal.
1988)).
231. Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled by
Brown, 751 P.2d at 470.
232. Id.
233. Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The drafters of com-
ment k did not intend to grant all manufacturers of prescription drugs a blanket ex-
ception to strict liability."); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987).
234. Hill, 884 F.2d at 1069.
235. Id.; see also Toner, 732 P.2d at 308.
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Many commentators agree with this majority view, arguing that
prescription drugs of varying social utility should not be treated
equally.236 In addition, commentators argue that a blanket applica-
tion of comment k limits the discretionary powers of the courts.237
Applying such blanket immunity for one class of product leads to
patently unjust results. 238
In contrast to the Restatement (Third)'s position and the Brown
line of cases, courts following the Feldman line of cases have de-
clined to defer to the FDA as the ultimate arbiter of prescription
drug designs.239 Many courts have noted that the FDA does not
review prescription drugs for optimal design. 24 ° Rather, the FDA's
oversight consists merely of minimal standards of conduct.24'
Many courts and commentators adhering to the Feldman line of
cases have noted the inadequacies of the FDA regulatory
scheme.242 In the past, the FDA has failed to prevent defective and
harmful prescription drugs and medical devices from reaching the
market.243 Worse yet, some commentators argue, the FDA has
been plagued with instances of prescription drug manufacturer
fraud.244 Many commentators argue that the FDA's underfunding,
understaffing, and exposure to changing political climates are
strong factors weighing against the agency's role as the sole arbiter
of prescription drug designs.245
Many commentators have argued that the Restatement (Third)
standard represents a complete abdication of defective design re-
view to the FDA.246 Under the Restatement (Third), a prescription
drug is not considered defectively designed if any reasonable
health care provider would prescribe the drug to any class of pa-
236. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 103.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. E.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1993);
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) ("[T]he FDA's determina-
tion, even if it consisted of a risk-utility balancing analysis, would not supplant the
risk-utility balancing required in the judicial process.").
240. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1391-95.
241. Id.
242. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 104-05; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1385-97 (noting
inadequacies in past enforcement efforts by the FDA).
243. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1396 (noting FDA criticism for lax oversight in re-
viewing new prescription drug applications).
244. Id. (noting cases where prescription drug manufacturers fabricated data sup-
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tients2 47 These critics assert that this standard places too much
faith in the FDA's regulatory role. 48 By foreclosing liability from
all but the most egregious situations, the Restatement (Third) effec-
tively employs FDA approval as a bright line rule.249 A drug will
not receive FDA approval if there is no potential net benefit to any
class of patients. Thus, if a prescription drug has received FDA
approval, it must confer some benefit to some class of patients, and
cannot be considered defective as a matter of law under the Re-
statement (Third). This regime of unquestioning reliance on the
FDA approval process has not been followed by many
jurisdictions.250
Most commentators do not completely discount the FDA's role
in regulating and protecting consumers from defectively designed
prescription drugs.251 However, some argue that the tort system
should serve as an adjunct to the FDA regulatory system.252 To the
extent the FDA cannot ensure regulatory compliance, the tort sys-
tem must act as a deterrent. 3
C. View From the Sidelines: Federal Predictions on the Future
of the Debate
Although no state court has formally adopted the Restatement
(Third) standard, several federal courts have discussed the applica-
tion of section 6(c) in claims of strict liability on the basis of defec-
tive design. Although federal opinions are not dispositive on state
law, federal courts may often provide a useful guide to the current
state and likely evolution of state law.254 In the absence of well-
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1997).
248. Id. § 6 cmt. b ("Courts have also recognized that the regulatory system gov-
erning prescription drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting the standards for drug
design."). This proposition is dubious. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 104.
249. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1380.
250. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 97. But see Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 96-97
(Utah 1991) (holding that FDA approval of a prescription drug precludes imposition
of strict liability).
251. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1385-87.
252. See id. at 1386. Professor Schwartz notes that the FDA regulatory and tort
systems often interact. For instance, as the FDA lacks the subpoena power possessed
by many other agencies, it must often rely on the tort system to bring information to
the forefront. The FDA frequently uses information obtained in this manner to initi-
ate regulatory action. In addition, there are areas where the FDA does not have
authority to regulate, or where the FDA has failed to regulate. In these situations, the
tort system must act as a deterrent. Id.
253. Id.
254. See generally Geri J. Yonover, A Kindler, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of
Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 307-10 (1994).
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settled state case law, a federal court's analysis may serve as a
guide to future state decisions.
The federal courts that have confronted the Restatement (Third)
handle the issue in several ways. One federal court has declined to
apply the Restatement (Third) standard, noting a complete absence
of state precedent. 5  Upon hearing motions for summary judg-
ment in Wheat v. Sofamor, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia was faced with the issue of applying
the Restatement (Third) standard.25 6 The plaintiffs had sued for
strict liability on the basis of defective design, after suffering inju-
ries subsequent to the implantation of "pedicle screws," medical
devices used as a catalyst for the fusion of spinal vertebrae.257
Noting that Georgia had not yet directly confronted the Restate-
ment (Third) the district court hesitated to apply it.258 As the
plaintiff's expert testified that implantation of the defendant's ped-
icle screws could be warranted in some instances, the court noted
that the plaintiff's strict liability claim would fail under the Restate-
ment (Third) standard. 9 While the court, without a detailed anal-
ysis, pronounced the Restatement (Third) standard "sound," the
plaintiff's defective design claim was ultimately decided on other
grounds.26 °
255. See Wheat v. Sofamor, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
256. Id.
257. For a detailed discussion of bone-screw litigation, see James M. Beck & John
A. Valentine, Challenging the Validity of FDCA-Based Causes of Action in the Tort
Context: The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55 FoOD DRUG L.J. 389 (2000).
258. Wheat, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 n.11. The court noted, however, a Georgia Su-
preme Court decision that had relied on a preliminary draft of the Restatement
(Third). Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 (Ga. 1994) (citing prelimi-
nary draft of Restatement (Third) to support use of risk-utility analysis in design defect
case). The district court also noted, however, that the Georgia Supreme Court's analy-
sis of the Restatement (Third) was limited to adopting a risk-utility analysis and did
not discuss section 6(c). Wheat, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 n.11.
259. Wheat, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 n.11.
260. Id. at 1361-62 (dismissing the plaintiff's design defect claim under risk-utility
grounds). Although the court described the Restatement (Third) standard as "sound,"
the opinion should not be read as an endorsement of the Restatement (Third). In
support of the proposition that the Georgia Supreme Court had been willing to look
to the Restatement (Third), the court noted that in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., the
Georgia Supreme Court had cited the Restatement (Third). However, the district
court failed to reconcile its lukewarm endorsement of the Restatement (Third), with
the meaning behind the opinion in Banks, whereby the Georgia Supreme Court
stressed the importance of a risk-utility analysis and reasonable alternative design
analysis. While Banks did not involve a defectively designed prescription drug claim,
the Northern District of Georgia failed to explain why the Restatement (Third) stan-
dard, without a reasonable alternative design provision or risk-utility analysis, was the
preferable standard.
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The United States District Court for the District of Arizona also
applied the Restatement (Third) standard in a defective design
claim, while noting that Arizona had not formally adopted the Re-
statement (Third) standard.2 61 After suffering injuries subsequent
to the implantation of defendant's esophageal device, the plaintiff
sued for strict liability on the basis of defective design.262 Although
the plaintiff argued that the design claim should be analyzed under
the Restatement (Second) standard, both parties agreed that Ari-
zona had demonstrated a "willingness to look to the Restatement
(Third) as the current statement of the law. '263 The court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, after the plaintiff's
expert testified that he himself might have used the defendant's
medical device under certain medical conditions. 64
Other federal courts have also been faced with the issue of ap-
plying the Restatement (Third) standard, and have done so, with
little analysis. In Sita v. Danek Medical, Inc., plaintiffs sued a pedi-
cle screw manufacturer in the Eastern District of New York, alleg-
ing strict liability on the basis of defective design. 265 The defendant
moved for summary judgment, refuting the plaintiff's evidence of a
design defect.2 66 Answering the defendant's motion, the plaintiff
urged the court to apply the Restatement (Third) standard. 67 The
court held that the plaintiff's design defect claim would fail under
261. See Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Az. 1999).
262. Id. at 182.
263. See id. (citing Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 867 (Ariz. 1994)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 10, 12 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995), in support of applying comparative fault principles to strict liability
claim)). The District Court also noted that no Arizona case had actually adopted the
Restatement (Third) standard. Id. at 185.
264. Id. The district court also noted that summary judgment in favor of defendant
would be proper under section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third), as the plaintiff's ex-
perts testified that it would not be possible to redesign the defendant's medical device
to improve safety. Id. at 185 n.2. The court did not explain its reason for applying the
Restatement (Third), only that the parties had agreed that Arizona had indicated a
willingness to look to the Restatement (Third) as the present state of the law. How-
ever, the authority cited by the court demonstrates that in no way had Arizona been
planning a wholesale adoption of the Restatement (Third), as the Jimenez court cited
the Restatement (Third) solely for support that Georgia had accepted the entire Re-
statement (Third), not that it had accepted the discrete principles contained therein.
Jimenez, 904 P.2d at 867.
265. See Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
266. Id. at 249.
267. Id. at 256 n.9.
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the Restatement (Third), as overwhelming evidence indicated that
the defendant's product represented the proper standard of care.268
One federal court has applied the Restatement (Third) standard,
and has used its analysis to predict the adoption of the higher stan-
dard by a state court.269 In yet another pedicle-screw case, plain-
tiffs sued for strict liability on the basis of defective design.2
Applying section 402(a) of the Restatement (Second), the court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.271 In dicta,
the court predicted that as a consequence of Pennsylvania's blan-
ket exclusion of prescription drugs from strict liability, Penn-
sylvania would eventually adopt section 6(c) of the Restatement
(Third).272 In contrast to the other federal opinions discussing the
Restatement (Third), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania effec-
tively furthers the debate on the future of the Restatement (Third)
in Pennsylvania. The district court noted Pennsylvania law inter-
prets comment k broadly, excepting all prescription drug manufac-
turers from strict liability on the basis of defective design.273 In
regards to state precedent, the court correctly made the connection
between Pennsylvania's blanket application of comment k, and its
eventual likely adoption of the Restatement (Third) standard. 4
Overall, federal courts confronted with the Restatement (Third)
in the context of defectively designed prescription drug claims do
268. Id. at 258-59. The court also noted that under New York law, a party seeking
damages in a strict products liability claim is required to present evidence of a reason-
able alternative design. See id. at 258 (citing Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450
N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983)). The court noted that summary judgment would have
also been appropriate for the plaintiff's failure to present evidence of a reasonable
alternative design. While the court briefly discussed applying the Restatement (Third),
it is unclear from the opinion whether the court actually applied the new standard, as
the plaintiff had been unable to show any evidence of design defect. Furthermore, the
court did not discuss the soundness of the Restatement (Third) standard in terms of
policy, nor did the court discuss whether, and to what degree, the Restatement (Third)
fit within established New York case law.
269. See Taylor v. Danek Medical, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 29, 1998).
270. Id. at *20.
271. Id. at *21-*23. The court noted that under Pennsylvania law, the strict liability
provisions of the Restatement (Second), section 402(a) are inapplicable to prescription
drugs. Id. at *21 (citing Hahn v. Richter, 673 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1996)). The district
court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would extend this principle to
prescription medical devices. Id. at *22.
272. Id. at *22-*23.
273. Id.
274. Id. For an analysis of the connection between applying comment k to except
all prescription drug manufacturers from strict liability on the basis of defective de-
sign, and the parallel effect of the Restatement (Third), see infra Part III.A.
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little to advance the debate.275 Federal interpretations of the issues
presented by the Restatement (Third) are spotty, and a true analysis
of the future of design defect liability is wanting.276 The federal
opinions that have dealt with design defect claims under the Re-
statement (Third) have not discussed the higher standard's suitabil-
ity in terms of policy.277 Few decisions have truly analyzed the
issues, and most have not debated the implications of adopting the
Restatement (Third).278 In addition, when applying the Restatement
(Third), federal courts have not sought to determine whether the
new standard squares with state precedent.279 If states are to re-
ceive guidance on how to proceed, they will not find it looking to
their sister federal courts.
IH. A UNIFIED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
As the prescription drug manufacturer liability debate continues
with the adoption of the Restatement (Third), it appears that states
have been given little guidance as to how they should proceed.
Faced with the conflicting interpretations of law by the ALI and
their own case law, states face the dilemma of either continuing
with precedent set over the past two decades which may or may
not conflict with the Restatement (Third), or abandoning state pre-
cedent in favor of the standard put forth by the Restatement
(Third).
A. Prescription Drugs Should Not Be Treated as a Favored
Product Category
By eliminating the review of prescription drug designs, and up-
holding a bright-line distinction between prescription drugs and
other consumer products, the Restatement (Third) essentially mir-
rors the minority view, following the Brown line of cases. Under
this paradigm, courts are to treat prescription drugs as a favored
product category, and prescription drug manufacturers are to be
completely excepted from strict liability claims on the basis of de-
fective design. In a sense, the Restatement (Third) is a restatement
275. See supra notes 255-268 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 255-268 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 255-268 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 255-268 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 255-268 and accompanying text. But see Taylor, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20265, at *22-*23; supra notes 269-274 (noting that the District court's predic-
tion that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would eventually adopt section 6(c) of the
Restatement (Third) squares with state precedent).
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of the law; not of the law of the majority, but of the law as the
reporters believe it should be.
The Restatement (Third), by providing a completely separate
standard for the analysis of design defect claims involving prescrip-
tion drugs, creates a categorical distinction between prescription
drugs and other consumer products. Courts following the Brown
view agree with this distinction. This view argues that prescription
drugs, as a product category, are more important to society. This
analysis is too broad to be effective. It is true that some prescrip-
tion drugs are extremely important to society. However, this pro-
position ignores the fact that different prescription drugs serve
society with unequal utility. Excepting manufacturers of all pre-
scription drugs ignores the important variations between different
prescription drugs, and treats prescription drugs as a favored prod-
uct category.
Although prescription drugs are important to society, many
other consumer products are important as well. Manufacturers of
countless other consumer products are held strictly liable for their
products' design defects. Simply because some prescription drugs
will confer a valuable benefit upon society is no reason to treat all
prescription drugs as possessing this benefit. However, the Restate-
ment (Third) does just that; treating all marketable prescription
drugs as possessing the same utility. This view constitutes an un-
warranted protection of prescription drugs, creating a favored
product category.
The Restatement (Third) furthers the view that prescription
drugs cannot be redesigned to increase safety. Adherents to this
view argue that since prescription drugs are often limited to a fixed
chemical composition, they are incapable of redesign. Such a pro-
position, if true, would further the minority view's argument for a
distinction between prescription drugs and other consumer prod-
ucts. For example, assume the existence of a prescription drug,
completely incapable of redesign, which provides an important so-
cietal utility. Such a prescription drug would deserve protection
from strict liability on the basis of defective design, as the benefit
provided by the drug would not be available by other, safer means.
However, the Restatement (Third), as well as the minority view,
fails to account for the fact that some prescription drugs can be
redesigned. Future advances in pharmaceutical technologies will
only make this more likely. Treating all prescription drugs as un-
avoidably unsafe ignores this reality. If the hypothetical prescrip-
tion drug discussed above were capable of being redesigned, the
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prescription drug may not be considered unavoidably unsafe, as
the drug's benefits would be available in a different form, with less
accompanying risks. The Restatement (Third) ignores this reality,
treating a prescription drug as unavoidably unsafe even if there ex-
ists a safer and effective alternative.
Furthermore, if a prescription drug is indeed incapable of being
redesigned, the same benefits may often be achieved by employing
different combinations of prescription drugs, lower dosages, or al-
ternative drugs altogether. Simply because a particular prescrip-
tion drug is limited to a fixed chemical composition should not
mean that the prescription drug's form is completely immutable.
Yet the Restatement (Third) ignores this fact as well.
In contrast to the Restatement (Third), and courts following the
Brown line of cases, the majority view appropriately recognizes
that prescription drugs should not be treated as a favored product
category. Under the majority's application of comment k, if our
hypothetical prescription drug were truly incapable of being rede-
signed, and should no reasonable alternative be available, the un-
avoidably unsafe determination would likely apply, and the
prescription drug's manufacturer would be excepted from strict lia-
bility on the basis of defective design. However, if the prescription
drug would be capable of being redesigned, or an alternative de-
sign was available, the manufacturer of our drug would properly be
held strictly liable for it's drug's design defects.
The Restatement (Third) also leans heavily on the learned inter-
mediary concept, in support of a categorical distinction between
prescription drugs and other consumer products. According to the
reporters, prescription drugs are unique among products in that
their use requires involvement by a prescribing physician. How-
ever, many prescribing physicians lack the superior knowledge of
the prescription drug manufacturer. Most physicians prescribe
drugs they know, not necessarily the best prescription drugs availa-
ble. Deferring to the prescribing physician in blanket fashion ig-
nores this reality.
In contrast to the Restatement (Third), the Restatement (Second),
with a selective application of comment k, best recognizes that not
all prescription drugs are fundamentally different from other con-
sumer products. The majority view achieves the best balance in its
treatment of prescription drugs, as a product category. While im-
portant prescription drugs, conferring a large societal utility are ex-
cepted from strict liability on the basis of defective design,
manufacturers of less important drugs will continue to be held
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strictly liable. A comparison of the two regimes illustrates the
overbreadth of the Restatement (Third), and of the jurisdictions fol-
lowing the Brown line of cases. Consider again our hypothetical
prescription drug, a life-saving vaccine, incapable of being rede-
signed, the use of which is accompanied by serious risks. Under
the Restatement (Second), the vaccine's manufacturer would not be
held strictly liable for injuries attendant with the drug's use. In
such a situation, the vaccine would clearly be considered unavoid-
ably unsafe. Although the risks of using the vaccine are high, pub-
lic policy would clearly militate against imposing strict liability.
Under the Restatement (Third), the manufacturer of the life-saving
vaccine would also be excepted from strict liability, if the vaccine's
manufacturer could show that reasonable health-care providers,
aware of the risks involved, would still prescribe the vaccine. Simi-
larly, in jurisdictions following the Brown line of cases, the vac-
cine's manufacturer would also be excepted from strict liability, as
under the minority view all prescription drugs are deemed un-
avoidably unsafe.
However, instead of a life-saving vaccine, consider at issue a cos-
metic drug, one not used to save lives, but for convenience. In such
a situation, assume that the prescription drug confers less of a soci-
etal benefit and is capable of redesign, or an alternate prescription
drug is available. Under the Restatement (Second), the manufac-
turer of such a drug will not be excepted from strict liability on the
basis of design, and will be held liable for injuries resulting from
the use of its drug. However, under the Restatement (Third), the
manufacturer will be completely excepted from strict liability.
Even though the cosmetic drug provides little societal benefit, it is
given the same protection as the life-saving vaccine. Jurisdictions
following the Brown line of cases would reach the same result.
B. Courts Should Not Reject Prescription Drug Design Review
Both the Restatement (Third), and courts following the Brown
line of cases, decline to allow judicial review of prescription drug
designs. Courts following the Feldman line of cases disagree, argu-
ing that courts should review the adequacy of prescription drug de-
signs. As prescription drugs differ in the benefit they provide to
society, the Feldman line of cases is correct.
Foreclosing review on the adequacy of prescription drug designs
serves to enforce the categorical distinction between prescription
drugs and other consumer products. By eliminating the possibility
of judicial design review, the Restatement (Third), and courts fol-
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lowing the Brown line of cases effectively treat all prescription
drugs as having an equal societal utility, higher than that of all
other consumer products. This is an artificial, unwarranted distinc-
tion between prescription drugs and other consumer products.
Under the Restatement (Third), no risk-utility review of prescrip-
tion drug design is allowed. A cosmetic prescription drug that pro-
vides little utility, but poses high risks is treated the same as a
lifesaving vaccine that involves few risks. Consequently, all pre-
scription drugs are considered to confer a social utility higher than
that conferred by other consumer products. While some prescrip-
tion drugs such as lifesaving vaccines may perform miracles, there
is little reason to place cosmetic drugs such as acne medications or
sleep aides as having equal social value. The majority of courts are
correct to observe the distinctions in efficacy possessed by different
prescription drug.
By excepting virtually all prescription drug manufacturers from
strict liability on the basis of defective design, the Restatement
(Third) effectively conscripts the FDA as an arbiter of pharmaceu-
tical quality. If a drug is FDA-approved, then it logically follows
that some reasonable health care providers would prescribe the
drug to some class of patients. Even if such a prescription drug
killed more patients than it helped, the manufacturer of the drug
would be excepted from strict liability.
Most courts have wisely rejected the notion that the regulatory
system is the ideal, and sole arbiter of prescription drug designs.
While the regulatory system provides an important function in en-
suring the overall safety and efficacy of prescription drugs, the
FDA should not serve as the sole arbiter of prescription drug de-
signs. The FDA does not possess the resources or facilities to re-
view all prescription drugs on the basis of design. The FDA does
not attempt to determine the ideal design for a prescription drug;
as such, courts must take on this role. In order to keep the quality
of prescription drugs at an optimal level, the tort system is neces-
sary to serve as an adjunct to the FDA.
CONCLUSION
While the law of strict products liability involving prescription
drugs has continued to evolve since the adoption of the Restate-
ment (Second), the paradigm represented by the Restatement
(Third) represents an unwelcome mutation; the Restatement
(Third), as well as the Brown line of cases are not preferable to the
existing standard, which fairly balances the public policy interests
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in developing new prescription drugs against the need to maintain
manufacturer liAbility for the defective design of their products.
The principles put forth by the Brown line of cases, holding on to
a. bare minority of jurisdictions, have been embraced by the Re-
statement (Third), and touted as the law of the land. However, this
assertion has not been borne out by the case law. Most courts have
rightly chosen not to immunize all prescription drug manufactur-
ers, recognizing that the societal utilities provided by "me-too" cos-
metic drugs pale in comparison with more important, lifesaving
drugs. Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) rejects this balanced
approach, seeking to protect all prescription drug manufacturers,
regardless of the value their products provide to society.
